ATHENA

GOVERNANCE INSIGHT

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Presidential Travel And Performance Accountability In Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Athena Centre for Policy and Leadership operates as an independent, non-partisan think tank in compliance with Nigerian laws and regulations, committed to promoting good governance, transparency, and accountability.
Our mission is to conduct rigorous research and provide evidence-based recommendations that contribute to the development of a prosperous and forward-looking society in Nigeria.

Cover image: President Bola Ahmed Tinubu waving as he departs for an official engagement. (Photo: State House Digital).

Introduction

Nigeria's ongoing fiscal consolidation, foreign exchange adjustments, and heightened public scrutiny of government spending, particularly following fuel subsidy removal and exchange-rate liberalisation, have intensified attention on the cost and value of executive decision-making. Within this context, presidential travel has become a visible and contested area of public expenditure, raising questions not about its legitimacy, but about its measurable contribution to national outcomes. As fiscal pressures deepen, the ability of the governance system to link executive travel to verifiable policy results has become increasingly relevant to fiscal credibility, institutional performance, and public trust.

Presidential travel has long served as a core instrument of diplomacy, economic engagement, and regional security coordination in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Since the restoration of democratic rule in 1999, successive administrations from Olusegun Obasanjo to Bola Ahmed Tinubu have relied on international engagements to restore diplomatic standing, attract investment, coordinate regional security responses, and position Nigeria within global governance institutions. In principle, such engagements are expected to generate identifiable national outcomes, including investment inflows, trade expansion, security cooperation, and institutional partnerships.

However, Nigeria's governance system does not consistently translate presidential travel into measurable, institutionally anchored outcomes. Public reporting mechanisms rarely allow systematic tracing of travel objectives, fiscal costs, implementing institutions, and post-engagement delivery. As a result, executive travel remains highly visible and fiscally significant, yet weakly integrated into performance accountability systems.

This edition of *Athena Governance Insight* examines the institutional architecture governing presidential travel in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, assesses empirical patterns across administrations, and identifies the governance constraints that limit the conversion of diplomatic engagement into measurable domestic outcomes.

Core Governance Problem

Nigeria lacks a formalised, performance-linked mechanism within its public finance and administrative system that systematically links presidential travel expenditures, diplomatic commitments, and post-engagement implementation outcomes within the public finance and performance management system. While executive travel is procedurally authorised through budgetary processes, it operates with limited outcome accountability, resulting in weak traceability between diplomatic engagement and domestic policy delivery.

The issue is not the frequency of presidential travel nor the legitimacy of executive diplomacy. Rather, it is the absence of a structured accountability framework that connects travel objectives, costs, commitments, responsible institutions, and implementation timelines.

Institutional Architecture And Constraints

Nigeria's constitutional framework vests broad authority over international engagement in the Presidency under Section 5 of the 1999 Constitution. This authority enables flexibility in foreign relations but also concentrates discretion over travel priorities, delegation composition, and diplomatic objectives.

Public finance oversight of presidential travel is exercised primarily through appropriation approval and ex-post financial compliance review. Travel expenditures are typically aggregated within broader budget classifications, limiting granular visibility into individual trips, their objectives, and associated outcomes. As a result, oversight mechanisms emphasise compliance with budgetary provisions rather than performance evaluation.

The accountability chain spans the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sector ministries, the Budget Office, the Auditor-General, and the National Assembly. However, it weakens at the point of post-engagement follow-through. Diplomatic commitments announced during state visits are not consistently assigned to designated lead institutions, nor are they systematically incorporated into ministerial performance reporting. In practice, no single institution holds end-to-end responsibility for translating diplomatic commitments into domestic implementation.

This institutional design creates a structural gap between procedural accountability and performance accountability. While travel expenditures may comply with fiscal rules, the governance system lacks the instruments required to assess whether diplomatic engagements generate outcomes commensurate with their cost.

President Bola Tinubu with Turkey President Recep Erdoğan during state visit in 2026 (Photo: State House Digital) .

Why The Problem Persists

Several interrelated political economy dynamics sustain this governance gap.

First, executive discretion over international engagements reduces institutional incentives to anchor travel decisions within structured performance frameworks. While flexibility enhances diplomatic responsiveness, it weakens both ex-ante objective setting and ex-post accountability.

Second, public finance oversight prioritises expenditure propriety rather than policy impact. Legislative review focuses on whether funds were authorised and spent appropriately, not whether diplomatic commitments translate into domestic outcomes.

Third, bureaucratic fragmentation diffuses responsibility for implementation. Agreements arising from presidential visits often involve multiple ministries and agencies without clearly designated lead institutions, weakening ownership and follow-through.

Fourth, political incentives favour high-visibility diplomacy. International engagements generate immediate signalling value, while implementation failures impose delayed and less visible costs.

Finally, public discourse tends to focus on travel frequency rather than governance quality, obscuring the underlying institutional deficit.

These dynamics sustain a system where diplomatic activity remains high, but implementation accountability is weak.

Empirical Patterns Across Administrations

Analytical Approach

Presidential travel engagements were assessed based on observable post-engagement outcomes, including implemented projects, formalised agreements with designated implementing institutions, budgetary allocations, or policy instruments linked to diplomatic commitments. The assessment focuses on governance follow-through rather than diplomatic activity or symbolism.

Cross-Administration Patterns

Across administrations, presidential travel has consistently supported diplomatic visibility and engagement, but its translation into measurable domestic outcomes has depended largely on underlying institutional capacity and policy coherence rather than the volume or intent of engagements.

i. **Under Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007)**, travel prioritised diplomatic reintegration and restored Nigeria's global standing, including securing Paris Club debt relief. However, economic outcomes such as industrial investment and export diversification remained limited due to domestic structural constraints and weak implementation tracking.

ii. **Under Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (2007–2010),** engagements reinforced regional leadership and South–South cooperation, but domestic economic impact was modest, constrained by infrastructure gaps, bureaucratic bottlenecks, and global economic shocks.

iii. **Under Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (2010–2015),** travel expanded infrastructure financing and security cooperation, particularly with China, yet implementation delays, debt concerns, and weak monitoring mechanisms limited developmental outcomes.

iv. **Under Muhammadu Buhari (2015–2023),** engagements advanced security cooperation and infrastructure financing, but outcome effectiveness was constrained by macroeconomic instability, weak enforcement institutions, and external shocks, with foreign investment inflows remaining volatile.

v. **Under Bola Ahmed Tinubu (2023–present),** travel has focused on economic reform diplomacy following subsidy removal and exchange-rate liberalisation. While international engagement has reinforced reform signalling, measurable outcomes remain difficult to assess due to the absence of structured reporting frameworks linking engagements to implementation.

President Muhammadu Buhari and King Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia.

Outcome-Based Assessment

Scope and Data Limitations

This assessment focuses on governance translation rather than diplomatic activity. It evaluates whether presidential travel engagements were followed by verifiable domestic actions attributable to Nigerian public institutions within a reasonable policy window.

The analysis draws on publicly available presidential schedules and communiqués, federal budget and Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) documents, official project and implementation records, multilateral financing disclosures, and legislative oversight reports where available.

It does not attempt to quantify the full economic impact of each trip; instead, it classifies engagements based on traceable institutional follow-through. Where public data is incomplete, classifications adopt a conservative interpretation.

Outcome Classification Method

Presidential trips were assessed against four criteria:

1. Existence of formal deliverables (agreements, MOUs, financing frameworks);
2. Evidence of post-engagement implementation;
3. Identification of a Nigerian lead implementing institution;
4. Traceable follow-through within 12–36 months.

Trips meeting at least two criteria, including implementation evidence, were classified as outcome-generating. Trips with formal commitments but weak or delayed follow-through were classified as partial outcomes, while those without verifiable domestic action were classified as non-outcomes. For aggregate analysis, outcome-generating and partial outcomes are reported jointly to reflect institutional realism.

Aggregate Outcome by Administration (1999–Present)

Across the Fourth Republic, 64 presidential trips with identifiable diplomatic or economic objectives were assessed. The results indicate that 73% of engagements generated at least partial institutional outcomes, while 27% showed no verifiable domestic follow-through. These figures reflect governance performance rather than diplomatic activity or economic impact.

Administrations	Trips Assessed	Outcome / Partial Outcome	Non-Outcome
Obasanjo (1999–2007)	20	17 (85%)	3 (15%)
Yar'Adua (2007–2010)	7	5 (71%)	2 (29%)
Jonathan (2010–2015)	10	7 (70%)	3 (30%)
Buhari (2015–2023)	16	11 (69%)	5 (31%)
Tinubu (2023– Till date)	11	7 (64%)	4 (36%)
Fourth Republic Total	**64**	**47 (73%)**	**17 (27%)**

Interpretation of Findings

Three empirically grounded observations emerge.

First, presidential travel in Nigeria is not predominantly outcome-free. Nearly three-quarters of assessed trips generated at least partial institutional outputs, most commonly in the form of financing frameworks, security cooperation arrangements, or infrastructure project commitments.

Second, outcome quality deteriorates sharply at the implementation and embedding stages. While agreements are frequently announced, fewer are systematically integrated into budgetary processes, ministerial performance frameworks, or medium-term planning instruments.

Third, variation across administrations is modest. Differences in outcome rates are better explained by macroeconomic context, security conditions, and data maturity than by leadership style or diplomatic orientation. This supports the conclusion that the constraint is systemic rather than personal.

Across administrations, presidential travel consistently produced diplomatic visibility and engagement platforms. However, the governance system rarely documents whether these engagements produced sustained domestic outcomes within defined timelines. The absence of outcome tracking limits cost-effectiveness assessment and undermines institutional learning.

Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and the Isreali Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2013. (Photo: Atta Awisat)

Comparative Governance Insights

Comparative experience from other presidential and semi-presidential systems shows that executive travel oversight can be strengthened without restricting diplomatic discretion, provided that post-engagement accountability is embedded within existing public finance and performance management systems.



In **Kenya**, parliamentary committees routinely request post-engagement briefings following major international visits, particularly where financing or security commitments are involved. This introduces a feedback loop between diplomatic engagement and domestic accountability without constraining executive flexibility. For Nigeria, this suggests that structured post-engagement reporting to the National Assembly could strengthen accountability without limiting diplomatic discretion.

In **Ghana**, executive travel expenditures are disaggregated within budget documentation, enabling legislative committees to trace costs and associated diplomatic objectives during appropriation and oversight hearings. While outcome measurement remains imperfect, clearer fiscal traceability enhances ex-post scrutiny. For Nigeria, this implies that disaggregating travel expenditure within budget frameworks could significantly improve fiscal transparency and legislative oversight.

In **Rwanda**, executive travel is integrated into national performance management systems, with commitments incorporated into ministerial delivery frameworks and tracked alongside domestic policy objectives. For Nigeria, this indicates that embedding travel-related commitments within existing performance monitoring systems could improve follow-through and policy continuity.

In **South Africa**, presidential international engagements are aligned with departmental mandates, and post-visit implementation responsibilities are more clearly assigned to line ministries. This strengthens institutional ownership, even where outcomes are delayed. For Nigeria, this highlights the importance of explicitly assigning lead implementing institutions for each diplomatic commitment.

Taken together, these cases demonstrate that effective governance of executive travel does not require new institutions. Rather, it depends on three design features: disaggregated fiscal reporting, explicit assignment of implementation responsibility, and integration of diplomatic commitments into existing performance monitoring systems. The relevance for Nigeria lies in institutional design choices, not regime comparison or performance ranking.

Policy Options for Reform

Reform does not require new agencies or constraints on diplomacy. It requires aligning existing institutions to ensure that presidential travel is systematically linked to measurable policy outcomes. This can be achieved through four mutually reinforcing governance actions.

1. Require Pre-Trip Policy Objectives

Each presidential trip should be anchored in clearly documented policy objectives aligned with national priorities. Travel briefs should identify expected deliverables, designate lead implementing institutions, and include relevant sector ministries within official delegations.

I. **Lead institution:** Presidency
II. **Supporting institutions:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sector MDAs

2. Disaggregate Travel Expenditure in Budget Reporting

Presidential travel expenditures should be itemised within budget documentation to enable traceability of costs, objectives, and outcomes. Audit processes should incorporate travel reporting compliance, while legislative oversight should include outcome-based review of major engagements.

I. **Lead institution:** Budget Office of the Federation
II. **Supporting institutions:** Auditor-General, National Assembly

3. Institutionalise Post-Engagement Reporting and Assignment

All international engagements should be followed by structured post-engagement summaries that identify commitments, assign responsible institutions, and specify indicative timelines. These commitments should be integrated into ministerial performance reporting frameworks.

I. **Lead institution:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs
II. **Supporting institutions:** Sector MDAs

4. Introduce Cost and Delegation Benchmarks

Delegation size and travel-related expenditure should be guided by transparent benchmarks aligned with fiscal sustainability. This would improve cost

Implementation Framework: KPIs, Timelines, and Institutional Responsibilities

Key Performance Indicators

The following indicators are designed to measure governance conversion, not diplomatic success. They rely on existing reporting instruments and institutions.

KPI	Measurement Authority	Reporting Frequency	Instrument
Percentage of presidential trips with published post-engagement summaries	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Quarterly	Official trip reports
Percentage of diplomatic commitments with designated lead MDAs	OSGF	Quarterly	Post-engagement assignment register
Time lag between engagement and first implementation report	Lead MDAs	Semi-annual	Ministerial performance reports
Percentage of travel-linked commitments reflected in MTEF or budget	Ministry of Finance / Budget Office	Annual	Budget documentation
Percentage of commitments reaching implementation or formal closure	Lead MDAs	Annual	Project and policy tracking reports

Indicative Timelines

Timelines are aligned with existing governance cycles rather than arbitrary deadlines.

Short Term (0–12 months)

1. Integration of post-engagement summaries into routine MFA reporting
2. Assignment of lead institutions for new diplomatic commitments
3. Initial legislative briefings during budget hearings

Medium Term (1–3 years)

1. Alignment of travel-linked commitments with MTEF cycles
2. Incorporation into ministerial performance assessments
3. Ex-post audit references where fiscal exposure exists

Longer Term (Beyond 3 years)

1. Review of recurring commitments across administrations
2. Identification of stalled or expired engagements for institutional learning

Institutional Responsibilities

1. Presidency / OSGF: coordination and assignment of post-engagement responsibilities
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: documentation, reporting, and diplomatic follow-through
3. Sector MDAs: implementation and performance reporting
4. Ministry of Finance / Budget Office: fiscal integration and expenditure traceability
5. National Assembly: oversight through existing committee processes

Governance Rationale

These benchmarks do not introduce new reporting burdens or organisations. They repurpose existing institutional processes to close the gap between diplomatic engagement and domestic accountability, enabling learning, cost-effectiveness assessment, and policy continuity.

Conclusion

Presidential travel will remain essential to Nigeria's international engagement. The governance question is not whether presidents should travel, but whether executive mobility operates within an institutional framework capable of delivering measurable national value.

Strengthening accountability around presidential travel would not constrain diplomacy. It would enhance fiscal credibility, improve policy delivery, and reinforce public trust by ensuring that international engagements translate into domestic outcomes. Without measurable accountability, executive travel risks generating visibility without verifiable national value.

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Appendix

Empirical Assessment of Presidential Travel Outcomes in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Obasanjo Administration (1999-2007)

Country / City	Event / Purpose	Key Successes	What Fell Short	Why It Fell Short
United States	Post-military diplomatic reintegration	Restored US–Nigeria diplomatic relations	Immediate investment surge limited	Investor caution after long military rule
United Kingdom	Strengthen bilateral ties & attract investment	Re-established strong Commonwealth ties	Limited rapid economic inflow	Institutional rebuilding stage
South Africa	Strengthen post-apartheid Africa alliance	Reinforced Nigeria–SA strategic partnership	AU reforms still evolving	Continental institutional transition
United Nations (USA)	Address the UNGA.	Restored Nigeria's global legitimacy	Domestic reforms gradual	Governance rebuilding takes time
United States	Meeting President Bill Clinton	Security & democratic cooperation strengthened	FDI growth modest	Economic fundamentals still weak
France	Economic & diplomatic engagement	Strengthened EU relations	Limited immediate trade shift	Structural export weakness
ECOWAS States	Liberia crisis mediation	Strengthened Nigeria's regional influence	Conflict persisted temporarily	Deep-rooted political instability
South Africa	African Union Launch	Nigeria key in AU formation	AU institutional reforms gradual	Continental transition from OAU
Canada (G8 Kananaskis)	Africa development lobbying	Elevated Africa on G8 agenda	No immediate mass economic shift	Reform implementation time lag
Liberia	Peace mediation	Facilitated Charles Taylor's exit	Regional instability remained	Fragile peace structures

Country / City	Event / Purpose	Key Successes	What Fell Short	Why It Fell Short
United States	Trade & reform talks	Continued diplomatic cooperation	Limited export diversification	Oil dependence
China	Trade & oil diplomacy	Expanded China–Nigeria trade	Trade imbalance widened	Limited manufacturing base
United Kingdom	Debt & investment dialogue	Strengthened debt negotiation support	Domestic poverty persisted	Structural economic weakness
France (Paris Club)	Debt relief negotiations	Secured $18bn debt cancellation	Required $12bn upfront repayment	Negotiated compromise
United Kingdom (G8 Gleneagles)	Lobby for Africa debt relief	G8 backed Nigeria deal	Poverty reduction gradual	Reform benefits medium-term
United States	IMF/World Bank meetings	Improved macroeconomic credibility	Social gains delayed	Stabilisation over redistribution
China	Infrastructure & oil cooperation	Increased bilateral trade	Manufacturing diversification limited	Infrastructure deficits
India	Energy & trade partnership	Expanded South–South relations	Industrial growth modest	Power & policy gaps
Germany (G8 Heiligendamm)	Africa development diplomacy	Sustained Nigeria's global reform voice	Limited domestic transformation	Institutional reform lag
United Nations	Final UNGA engagement	Maintained diplomatic continuity	Domestic economic inequality persisted	Structural socio-economic issues

Yar'Adua Administration (2007–2010)

Country / City	Event / Purpose	Key Successes	What Fell Short	Why It Fell Short
United States (New York & Washington D.C.)	UN General Assembly (UNGA), bilateral talks, diaspora engagement	Repositioned Nigeria diplomatically; improved US relations; strengthened energy & security dialogue	Limited major investment deals	Domestic instability (Niger Delta), power issues, corruption concerns
France (Paris)	State visit to strengthen bilateral ties & attract investment	Strengthened energy cooperation; improved France–Nigeria relations	Few large-scale investments materialised	Infrastructure gaps; bureaucratic bottlenecks
Ethiopia (Addis Ababa)	African Union (AU) Summit	Reinforced Nigeria's continental leadership; supported peace & governance initiatives	No direct economic returns	AU resolutions lacked enforcement; focus mainly political
South Africa (Johannesburg)	AU Summit & bilateral trade/ security talks	Improved ties between Africa's two largest economies; private-sector dialogue	Trade growth below expectations	Economic rivalry; structural trade barriers
Ethiopia (Addis Ababa)	AU Summit	Continued leadership role in continental policy & security	Limited measurable domestic economic benefit	Continental policy slows to translate into local gains
Brazil (Brasília)	State visit focused on energy, agriculture & trade cooperation	Strengthened South–South cooperation; agricultural knowledge exchange	Limited policy	Weak follow-up; structural challenges; 2008–09 global financial crisis
Gambia (Banjul)	ECOWAS Summit on regional integration & security	Reinforced Nigeria's leadership in West Africa; advanced security talks	Slow regional economic integration	Uneven ECOWAS economies; trade barriers

Jonathan Administration (2010–2015)

Country / City	Event / Purpose	Key Successes	What Fell Short	Why It Fell Short
United States (UNGA, US–Africa Summit)	Multilateral diplomacy, investment attraction, security cooperation	Elevated Nigeria's global visibility; strengthened counterterrorism cooperation; reinforced U.S.–Nigeria relations	Limited surge in U.S. FDI; Boko Haram crisis worsened	Security instability; human rights concerns; weak domestic reforms
China (State Visits 2011, 2013)	Infrastructure financing, trade, energy cooperation	Major bilateral agreements signed (rail, power); increased trade volume; infrastructure funding	Trade imbalance widened; project delays; debt concerns	Weak monitoring; oil dependency; bureaucratic bottlenecks
France (G20 2011; Security Summits 2014)	Economic diplomacy; counterterrorism coordination	Strengthened regional coalition against Boko Haram; raised global attention to insecurity	Insurgency persisted; limited operational improvement	Complex cross-border insurgency; weak regional enforcement
Ethiopia (AU Summits)	Continental diplomacy, governance & peacekeeping	Maintained Nigeria's leadership role in AU; reinforced democratic norms	Limited measurable domestic economic impact	Multilateral diplomacy often symbolic; no structured outcome tracking
South Africa & Regional African Visits	Trade cooperation, regional integration	Strengthened bilateral ties; promoted regional dialogue	Trade growth modest; diplomatic tensions (e.g., xenophobia issues)	Structural trade barriers; economic rivalry
United Kingdom	Diplomatic relations; investor engagement; image-building	Maintained strategic partnership; engaged UK investors	Limited industrial transformation; image weakened during Chibok crisis	Domestic insecurity overshadowed diplomacy
Germany	Economic cooperation & trade discussions	Encouraged dialogue on economic partnerships	Few large-scale industrial outcomes	Implementation gaps; governance challenges

Brazil (Rio+20)	Sustainable development diplomacy	Enhanced Nigeria's participation in global sustainability discourse	Limited domestic environmental reform implementation	Weak policy follow-through
Kenya, Namibia, Malawi, Gabon	Regional diplomacy & bilateral cooperation	Strengthened African diplomatic ties; promoted regional engagement	Limited economic transformation	Focus more diplomatic than transactional

Buhari Administration (2015–2023)

Country / City	Event / Purpose	Key Successes	What Fell Short	Why It Fell Short
United States	Meeting with President Obama; security & anti-corruption	Renewed military cooperation & arms sales discussions	Boko Haram not eliminated	Deep-rooted insurgency dynamics
France	Regional summit on Boko Haram	Strengthened Multinational Joint Task Force cooperation	Insurgency persisted	Cross-border security complexity
Iran	Gas Exporting Countries Forum	Maintained Nigeria's energy diplomacy presence	No major gas investment breakthrough	Global oil price crash
United Kingdom	Asset recovery & investment talks	Progress on Abacha loot repatriation	Slow recovery process	Legal hurdles abroad
China	Infrastructure financing	Rail projects (Lagos-Ibadan, Abuja-Kaduna) advanced	Rising debt concerns	Loan-based financing model
United States	Global anti-corruption advocacy	Elevated Nigeria's international image	Limited domestic reform speed	Weak enforcement institutions
Germany	G20 Compact with Africa	Investor engagement platform	FDI did not significantly increase	Forex & policy instability
United States	Infrastructure & loans	Further infrastructure agreements	Debt sustainability debate intensified	Heavy external borrowing

China (FOCAC)	Infrastructure & loans	Further infrastructure agreements	Debt sustainability debate intensified	Heavy external borrowing
Japan (TICAD)	Development cooperation	Strengthened development dialogue	Limited industrial relocation to Nigeria	Power & regulatory gaps
Russia	Russia-Africa Summit	Defence & nuclear cooperation discussions	No operational nuclear project	High capital & regulatory barriers
Chad	Regional security cooperation	Reinforced Lake Chad Basin alliance	Insurgency continued	COVID-19 disruptions
United States (UNGA)	Democracy & development agenda	Maintained diplomatic relevance	Limited economic inflow	Pandemic economic slowdown
United States (UNGA)	Security & climate issues	Climate diplomacy participation	Limited climate funding accessed	Competitive global funding space
South Korea	World Bio Summit	Health & biotech cooperation dialogue	No immediate large investment	Early-stage cooperation
United States	US-Africa Leaders' Summit	Maintained Nigeria-US relations	Few new landmark agreements	End-of-tenure timing

Tinubu Administration (2023-Till Date)

Country / City	Event / Purpose	Key Successes	What Fell Short	Why It Fell Short
France	Summit for a New Global Financial Pact (Climate & Reform Support)	Improved international confidence in subsidy removal & FX reforms; strengthened multilateral ties	No immediate financial inflow	Investors cautious; waiting for reform consistency
Guinea-Bissau	ECOWAS Summit on Niger coup	Assertive regional leadership; pro-democracy stance	Sanctions controversial; ECOWAS cohesion weakened	Divided regional interests; limited appetite for military action

India	G20 Leaders' Summit	Elevated trade visibility; reform narrative promoted	Limited immediate FDI surge	Policy transition uncertainty; FX volatility
United States	UN General Assembly	Promoted economic reform agenda; strengthened US dialogue	Inflation surges overshadowed diplomacy	Subsidy removal + currency depreciation shock
Ethiopia	African Union Summit (AfCFTA focus)	Reinforced continental trade diplomacy	Intra-African trade barriers remain	Infrastructure & logistics gaps
Netherlands & Saudi Arabia	Investment engagement & WEF Riyadh	Expanded Gulf & European investment discussions	No major confirmed FDI	Investor caution; domestic instability
China	FOCAC Summit	Sustained infrastructure diplomacy	Debt sustainability concerns	Loan-based financing model
Brazil	BRICS Summit (Partner-country status)	Strategic geopolitical diversification	No immediate trade transformation	BRICS expansion still evolving
United States	UN General Assembly	Continued reform & defence cooperation dialogue	Security challenges persisted	Decentralised criminal networks; economic hardship
United Arab Emirates	Bilateral economic & visa negotiations	Addressed visa/ travel restrictions; improved bilateral ties	Broader economic hardship unresolved	Domestic structural constraints

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